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JOINT CRIMINAL CONFUSION
Jens David Ohlin*

Article 25 on individual criminalresponsibility has generated more conflicting
interpretationsthan any otherprovision in the Rome Statute. Part ofthe problem is that it is impossible to construct a coherent and nonredundantinterpretation ofArticle 25 (3)(d) on group complicity. Because of unfortunate drafting,
both the requiredcontribution and the requiredmental element are impossible
to discernfrom the inscrutablelanguage. As a result, it is nearly impossible to
devise a holistic interpretationofArticle 25(3)(d) thatfits together with the rest
ofArticle 25 andArticle30 on mental elements. One possible solution is to repair
Article 25 with an amendment that replacesArticle 25 (3)(d) with a clearprovision specifically incorporatingsome joint liability doctrine, albeit a version that
excludes the worst excesses of the doctrine known asjoint criminalenterprise.

I. INTRODUCTION

The most pressing issue facing the Assembly of State Parties is not aggression'
but the confusing contours of the Rome Statute provisions on group complicity and their relationship to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

i. The crime of aggression was excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC until such
time as the Assembly of State Parties could agree to and adopt a definition of the crime.
Since the passage of the Rome Statute in 1998, the question of aggression has dominated
both the diplomatic and scholarly agendas. See, e.g., Troy Lavers, [Pre]Determining the
Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to Allow the International Criminal Court Its
Freedom?, 7 1Alb. L. Rev. 299 (2008); Giorgio Gaja, The Long Journey Towards Repressing
Aggression, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 427
(Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta & John R.WD. Jones eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute Commentary].
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 12, Number 3, PPS 4o6-419. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
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Since the ICTY Appeals Chamber issued its Tadi opinion in 1999,2 JCE
has quickly emerged as the most important mode of liability in modern
international criminal law? Indeed, it is charged in almost every indictment at the ICTY.4 Its status as a part of customary international law is
being debated by the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, which is considering whether to apply it to crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.
However, the exact relationship between JCE and the Rome Statute's provision on group complicity, Article 25(3)(d), remains a mystery. Does it incorporate JCE, reject it, expand it, contract it, or revise it?5 Although JCE
itself has been exhaustively analyzed in the scholarly literature, few articles
have specifically focused on Article 25(3)(d), 6 and even courts have tried to
avoid it. Indeed, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber recently sidestepped the provision entirely and preferred instead to use Article 25(3)(a) and the concept

2. Prosecutor v. Tadik, Case No. IT-9 4 -i-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment,

226-229 (July

15, 1999).
3. For a defense of the doctrine in light of recent criticisms, see Antonio Cassese, The
Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise, 5 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 109 (2007) [hereinafter Cassese, Proper Limits] (noting
that JCE has become the "darling" of prosecutors). The comment echoes the famous
phrase from Judge Learned Hand that conspiracy was the "darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." See Harrison v. United States, 7 F.d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
4. Exact statistics have not been compiled, though anecdotal evidence suggests that
the vast majority of indictments charged JCE as a mode of liability. See Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Cal.
L. Rev. 75, 137 (2005) (referring to JCE as "the nuclear bomb of the international prosecutor's arsenal").
5. The provision provides that "a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person . . . (d) In any
other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional
and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of
the group to commit the crime. .. "
6. Compare Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes,
Article by Article 743, 754 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (subsidiary liability in the
absence of liability for aiding and abetting), with Albin Eser, Individual Criminal
Responsibility, in Rome Statute Commentary, supra note I, at 767, 8o2 (complicity in
group crimes).
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of co-perpetration as a means of prosecuting joint criminality.7 These deficiencies will be corrected here: Part II will explain why the drafting of
Article 25 was conceptually disorganized; Part III will consider the nature
of the contribution required for group complicity; Part IV will demonstrate that the required mental element is either unclear or redundant, depending on your interpretation. In the end, Article 25(3)(d) may even
stake out liability for complicity that far exceeds the conspiracy liability
that its drafters were so intent on avoiding. The irony-and the overall
confusion-is intolerable. Article 25(3)(d) is hopelessly tangled because no
coherent interpretation of the provision is possible; the only solution is
amending the statute and establishing clear liability rules for joint criminal action.

II. THE MANY FACES OF ARTICLE 25
I have previously argued that Article 25( 3)(d) represents a statutory surrogate for joint criminal enterprise. 8 While JCE creates liability for participation in joint endeavors, Article 25 makes no direct mention of joint
criminal endeavors but instead establishes liability for individuals who
"contribute" to a group acting with a common purpose. As the following
analysis will demonstrate, Article 25 effectively stakes out similar ground
as both JCE liability and the common law doctrine of conspiracy liability,
though if it was crafted by negotiators at Rome to restrict expansive U.S.style conspiracy liability, it certainly did not succeed on that front.9 Both
7. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-oIfo4-oi/o6, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007).
8. See Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 69 (2007). See also Thomas Weigend, Intent,
Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of
Charges, 6 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 471, 478 (2oo8) (noting that Article 25( 3)(d) "probably
cover[s] at least some forms of JCE"). Even the Tadi6 court recognized when it originally
formulated JCE that a "substantially similar notion was subsequently laid down in Article
25 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court" and that "this provision upholds the
doctrine under discussion." See Tadi6 at 1 222.
9. Cf. Kai Ambos, Amicus Brief for Pre-Trial Chamber on Joint Criminal Enterprise,
in Criminal Investigation Against Kaing, Case No. ooI/i8-o 7 -200 7 -ECCC/OCIJ (PTC
o2), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, at i5 (Oct. 27, 2OO8), available
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/64/D99-3-27_EN-Ambos.pdf
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Article 25(3)(d) and JCE are alternate theories for establishing complicity
in collective criminality. Just as JCE provides vicarious liability for members who conspire together to pursue collective criminal action, Article
25(3)(d) appears to provide derivative liability for accomplices.' ° Unfortunately, though, Article 2 5(3)(d) is doctrinally incoherent.
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has concluded that Article 25(3)(d) "is
closely akin to the concept of joint criminal enterprise or the common
purpose doctrine adopted by the jurisprudence of the ICTY."" The PreTrial Chamber referred to this as being a "residual form of accessory liability which makes it possible to criminalize those contributions to a crime
which cannot be characterized as ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding,
abetting or assisting within the meaning of article 25(3)(b) or article 25(3)(c)
of the Statute, by reason of the state of mind in which the contributions
were made."' 2 In other words, the provision is a catch-all. A similar view
is taken by Eser in his contribution to the Rome Statute Commentary,
when he concludes that the provision, which he terms "complicity in
group crimes," is
superfluous since the thresholds of aiding and abetting are, according to
subparagraph (c), already so low that it is difficult to imagine many cases
needing a special provision such as subparagraph (d). On the other hand,
with regard to the group factor of this type of complicity, it may still have
some symbolic relevance. Clearly, the employment of obviously different
mental concepts in this provision can hardly hide the lack of expertise in
criminal theory when this provision was developed.'"
Likewise, Ambos concludes in the Triffterer commentary that Article
25(3)(d), and its genesis in an earlier antiterrorism convention, represents
a compromise position regarding the controversial concept of conspiracy,"'

[hereinafter Ambos, JCE Amicus Brief]. See also Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems,
supra note 8, at 8o; George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental
Principles of Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 546 (2005) UCE is "the statutory surrogate of joint criminal enterprise").
so. Cf. Ambos, JCE Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 14-15.
i. Lubanga, 335.
12. Lubanga, 337.
13. See Eser, supra note 6, at 803.
14. Id. at 757. The controversial history of the concept of conspiracy in the law of war
is well documented in George P Fletcher, Amicus Curiae Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy
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but the compromise "demonstrates that a provision drafted without regard

to basic dogmatic categories will create difficult problems of interpretation
for the future ICC."' 5 Given the overwhelming number of doctrinal tensions in Article 25 explored in the following sections of this article, the only
available course of action is not interpretation, but revision. Instead of
straining to impose a coherent reading on Article 25(3)(d), the better avenue is for the Assembly of State Parties to revise the statute. Revision is the
only way that the confusion will be prevented from spreading: the language
of Article 25(3)(d) was recently borrowed by the Security Council and inserted into the hastily drafted Statute for the U.N.-backed Special Tribunal
for Lebanon.' 6 The doctrinal stakes go well beyond the ICC.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROUP ENDEAVORS

Article 25's reference to "contributions" is confusing to say the least. Some

scholars have interpreted this language as creating a form of complicity liability wholly different from JCE liability. 7 For example, Cassese argues
that Article 25(3) (d) regulates contributions to a common criminal endeavor
by a member who stands outside the criminal group, while JCE itself
and International Law in Support of Petitioner, 2006 WL 53979 (arguing that conspiracy
is not a triable offense under the laws of war), filed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2oo6).
15. See Ambos, supra note 6, at 759. The use of the word "dogmatic," or dogmatisch in
German, refers to criminal law theory.
16. See S.C. Res. 1757 art. 3 (l)(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/s757 (May 30, 2007), creating the
Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
17. See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 213 (2d ed. 2008) ("the gist of
Article 2 5( 3)(d) is the regulation not of JCE but rather of a different mode of responsibility"). This represents a departure from his earlier view. Compare with Cassese, Proper
Limits, supra note 3, at 132; Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-9 4 -I-A, ICTY Appeals
Judgment, 1 222 (July I5, 1999). Other scholars also took the same or similar views. See
William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 211 (3 d ed.
2007); Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems, supra note 8, at x; Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal
Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 159, 172 (2007) ("the only
form of participation comparable with JCE II or III is that of collective responsibility as
laid forth in Article 25( 3)(d) ICC Statute"). However, Cassese's most recent view is supported in part by Eser's analysis in the Rome Statute Commentary. See Eser, supra note 6,
at 803 (noting that the "group factor of this type of complicity ... may still have some
symbolic relevance").
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regulates internalparticipation in a joint criminal plan.' Under this view,
the difference between the two categories comes down to membership.
Cassese's view is arguably supported by structural similarities between
Article 25(3)(d) and domestic complicity provisions criminalizing aiding,
abetting, inducing, or facilitating a crime.'9 In such situations, the accomplice arguably renders aid to-but does not join-the criminal plan.2"
Unfortunately, accomplice liability in many domestic jurisdictions, and
certainly in the U.S., is not predicated on a factual determination that the
accomplice is not a member of the criminal group. Of course, the reverse
is certainly true: conspiracy liability or liability as a principal requires a
factual determination that the defendant is a member of the criminal
group. However, it is a logical fallacy to take this truth and deduce that
membership precludes accomplice liability. Accomplice liability is certainly not predicated on a determination that the defendant is not a member of the criminal group.2 Indeed, on some theories of accomplice liability,
defendants are prosecuted precisely because they are considered participants in a criminal endeavor with a unity of purpose or a commonality of
objective.22 Indeed, in many cases prosecutors will charge defendants as accomplices even though they were members of the criminal group, especially
if the jurisdiction makes accomplices vicariously liable for the foreseeable
23
actions of the principal perpetrators.
Furthermore, Article 25( 3)(d) makes no mention of an "outside" or "external" element for the contribution in question. Specifically, the provision provides liability for a person who "contributes to the commission or
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with
a common purpose," followed by the requirement that the contribution
be made "with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose

I8. See Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 17, at

213.

I9.See, e.g., I8 U.S.C. § 2.
2o. For example, i8 U.S.C. § 2(b) penalizes an individual who "willfully causes an act
to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense," thus suggesting at first glance that the act is performed by another, not by the accomplice.
21. Indeed, note that I8U.S.C. § z(b) allows accomplice liability for performing acts
indirectly; there is no requirement of outside status in either federal or state statutes, the
Model Penal Code, or the case law.
22. See, e.g., People v. Russell, 91 N.Y.2d 280 (N.Y. 1998).
23. This produces a similarly expansive liability scheme as Pinkerton conspiracy liability. See, e.g., People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410 (Ct. App. 1987).
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of the group" or "be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit the crime." Given that there is no mention of inside or outside
status at all, one should be hesitant before reading it into the statute.
Cassese distills the element from the overall structure of Article 25,24 as
well as the similar category of "external participation in mafia crimes"
found in Italian penal law.25 But perhaps the best evidence for the "outside
contribution" view comes from the suggestion that the language for
Article 25(3)(d) was allegedly borrowed from Article 2(3) of the 199 7
International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing,
which was opened for signature in 1998 at around the same time that the
Rome Statute was finalized.26 Article 2(3) of the Convention provided liability for a person who "[i]n any other way contributes to the commission
of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph I or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal
activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the in'
tention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned. 27
Scholars who favor this interpretation have a very particular motivation. First, the Tadic court famously interpreted JCE as falling under
the ICTY Statute's provision on commission.28 Consequently, if Article
25 (3)(d) does not codify JCE, then the ICC would be free to import the
24. See Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 17, at 213 (perhaps assuming
that contributions by definition come from non-members).
25. See id. at 213 n.37 (discussing concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa).
26. For a discussion of the drafting history at Rome, see Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding
and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. Int'l
Hum. Rts. 304, 313 (2008). Diplomats involving in the negotiations at Rome confirm that
the Terrorism Convention was the inspiration for the text of the Article 25( 3)(d) compromise, though also acknowledging that the text was taken "with slight modifications." See
Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in The International Criminal Court:
The Making of the Rome Statute I89, 199 (Roy Lee ed., 1999).
27. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164
art. 2(3)(c) at 389, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/52/ 4 9 (Jan. 8,
1998). Also, the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted in Tadi6 that the drafting history of the
Terrorism Convention "does not shed any light on the reasons behind the adoption of this
text." See Prosecutor v. Tadik, Case No. IT- 9 4 -I-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment, J 221 (July 15,
1999).
28. See Tadi6 at 188. The controversy surrounding the Tadi6 opinion's structural reading of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute is critically discussed in Ohlin, Three Conceptual
Problems, supra note 17, at 71-74.
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Tadiz" version of the doctrine through the Rome Statute's provision on
commission, Article 25(3)(a), in much the same way that the ICTY
Appeals Chamber imported the judicially recognized doctrine of JCE
through an interpretation of the ICTY Statute's use of the term "committed." (Or they might simply import the doctrine by recognizing its
existence in customary international law.) However, if in the alternative,
the court determines that Article 25(3)(d) does indeed codify liability for
joint criminal endeavors, then the relevance of Tadi" as a precedent and
29
the rest of the ICTY's JCE jurisprudence recedes into the background.
The ICC would then be required to engage in a first-order analysis of the
liability provisions contained in Article 25(3)(d), which might conceivably lead to a different result than the version of JCE identified by the
ICTY in Tadic?
To remain doctrinally consistent, if we were to determine that Article
25(3)(d) does not codify JCE, one would have to admit that JCE is unavailable as a mode of liability at the ICC (because it is by definition absent from the statutory scheme).3 ' However, Cassese argues that the Rome
29. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-oI/o4-oi/o6, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007), 322 & passim. For a critical discussion of the
interpretative relationship between the ICC's analysis of the Rome Statute and the ICTY

jurisprudence on JCE, see Hdctor Olisolo, Developments in the Distinction Between
Principal and Accessorial Liability in Light of the First Case-Law of the International
Criminal Court, in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Carsten
Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
30. Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga concluded that Article 25( 3)(d) codifies
a residual form of liability "which cannot be characterised as ordering, soliciting, inducing,
aiding, abetting or assisting within the meaning of article 25 ( 3)(b) or article 25(3)(c) of
the Statute, by reason of the state of mind in which the contributions were made."
Nonetheless, the PTC referred to article 2 5(3 )(d) as being "closely akin" to the concept of
JCE. See Lubanga, 335.
31. This result would be mandated by the requirement that the criminal law requires
advanced legislative enactments, or nullum crimen sine lege scripta. For a discussion of the
maxim, see Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law i8 (2009). Of course,
common law countries, with a history of prosecuting individuals for common law crimes,
have shown far less fidelity to this maxim. The maxim's status within international criminal law is both controversial and continually contested because the discipline draws from
both civil and common law traditions. Furthermore, the discipline is only now going
through a process of rigorous penal codification (in the form of the Rome Statute), following a lengthy historical period of wartime prosecutions for violations of the laws of war
that were either uncodified or lightly codified. See, e.g., Instructions for the Government
of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. oo (Lieber Code) (1863).
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Statute implicitly permits JCE as a mode of liability because Article
25(3)(a) allows for liability if an individual "commits such a crime" as an
individual or "jointly with another."32 It is unclear how this could encompass JCE since it appears to refer to co-perpetration. Furthermore, the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has recently taken the position that with regard to
co-perpetration and Article 25, the Rome Statute requires action "with intent" as a required mental element under the Statute.3 3 In light of this,
JCE III (vicarious liability for criminal acts of others that fall outside the
scope of the criminal agreement) should be inconsistent with the Statute's
intent requirement.34 The only way around this argument is to seize upon
the language in Article 30 of the Rome Statute that the mental requirement of acting with intent is the default requirement "unless otherwise
provided." This is clearly a reference to the rest of the Rome Statute, so
that the provision means that the required mental element is acting with
intention unless otherwise provided by the Rome Statute. Others have
concluded that the phrase "unless otherwise provided" also creates an exception for other mental states provided for in customary international
law.35 This view, while doctrinally sophisticated, is dangerous because it
cuts against the significant purpose and rationale for creating a codified international penal statute in the first instance, where reliance on customary
law or common law crimes is eliminated (due to a concern regarding the
principle of legality).3 6 If one allows the importation of different or lower
requirements for the mental element from customary international law,
then the whole point of crafting Article 30 in the first place disappears.
The more consistent argument, if indeed Article 25 (3)(d) does not codify
32. See Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 17, at 212 (citing article 25(),
although probably intending to cite article 25(3)).
33. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the mental state of dolus eventualis would
meet this requirement but not "[wihere the state of mind of the suspect falls short of accepting that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omis-

See Lubanga, 355.
sions ....
34. Id. However, the PTC could conceivably reach the opposite result if they view JCE
III as a form of dolus eventualis.
35. See, e.g., Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided: Article
30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal
Law, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 35, 43 (2oo5) (noting the controversial nature of this position).
36. See Bohlander, supra note 31, at 18; Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 9, at 539 ("fundamental concerns... lead us vigorously to oppose the reliance on CIL as means of inculpation in criminal prosecutions, whether in domestic courts or international courts").
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JCE, is to admit that JCE is currently unavailable as a mode of liability before the ICC.
The "outside contributor" interpretation of Article 25(3)(d), promising
at first glance, is ultimately unconvincing for a number of reasons. First,
the relevant language in the International Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombing is directly preceded by a provision, Article 2( 3 )(b),
that states that a person is liable if he "[o] rganizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph i or 2" (emphasis added), which
thus casts a particular light on the language in Article 2(3)(c) of the
Convention that provides for liability if a person "[i]n any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph i or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose." 37 It is
therefore clear in the context of this treaty's text that the contribution
comes from an external source outside of the criminal group. No such
analogous provision exists in the Rome Statute statutory scheme. 8
The "outside contributor" interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) is also problematic because the Rome Statute already has a provision in Article 25(3) (b)
for facilitating, aiding and abetting, or assisting in the commission of an
offense. This provision arguably covers all cases of accomplice complicity,
thus making Article 25(3)(d) dangerously redundant. In an attempt to interpret away the redundancy, Cassese argues that 25(3)(c) applies only to
those who aid and abet a single perpetrator, while 25( 3)(d) covers individuals who aid and abet a "plurality of persons."39 This reading is laudable in
that it reads into the Rome Statute a desire on the part of the negotiators
to craft specific provisions that deal with the inherently (and distinctively)
collective nature of many international crimes. Although I have long argued for the collective nature of international crimes and the development
of criminal law doctrines tailored to penalize them in conformance with
the principle of individual culpability, there is questionable evidence of
similar motivations on the part of the Rome Statute's drafters. Indeed, the
interpretation runs afoul of a basic structural reading of Article 25 as a

37. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 27,
art. 2( 3)(b).
38. See Rome Star. art. 25(3)(c) ("for the purpose of facilitating...
39. See Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 17, at 213. The view is supported by Eser, supra note 6, at 802 (complicity for group crimes requires a group of at
least three persons).
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whole.40 Is there any evidence that the parties to the Rome Statute purposely insisted on one provision inculpating individuals who aid and abet
single perpetrators and a separate provision inculpating individuals who
aid and abet multiple perpetrators? If this were the case, one would think
that the former provision would be limited by its terms to single perpetrators. But Article 25(3)(c)'s provision on aiding and abetting, by its own
terms, is certainly broad enough to cover aiding and abetting a plurality of
persons, since nowhere by its terms is it limited to aiding and abetting a
single individual. 1 If the framers of the Rome Statute had drafted a section that covered aiding and abetting generally, why would they feel it necessary to make a second, redundant provision dealing with aiding and
abetting common criminal endeavors, and then codify no provision
criminalizing direct participation in a common criminal endeavor? The
supposed motivation remains elusive. Indeed, the result is doctrinally incoherent. Accomplice liability is, by definition, derivative liability, in the
sense that it presupposes the existence of a primary offense. But under the
reading of Article 25(3)(d) being considered, there is no primary offense of
direct participation in a group crime, only derivative liability for contributing as an outside accomplice. The only solution to this problem is to
find this primary offense in the Article 25(3)(a) notion of committing an
offense "jointly with another." This is unsatisfactory since it requires that
we equate committing a crime "jointly with another" as being equivalent
to "a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose." If the
drafters meant these two phrases to be equivalent, then why were entirely
different phrases used? This violates the basic canon of interpretation that
differences in phraseology usually exist for a reason, i.e., they are indicative of a shift in meaning and should not be explained away as mere
caprice. Perhaps this explains the scholarly consensus that Article 25(3)(d)
betrays the drafters' basic ignorance of criminal law theory. 2

40.

The reading might be plausible if we were comparing one provision on aiding and

abetting as a form of derivative liability with a second provision on participationin joint
criminal endeavors. But that is not the comparison here. We are comparing one general
provision on complicity with a second, more specific, provision on complicity.
41. This is made clear by, for example, Eser, supra note 6, at 8o2-o3 (noting that the assistance level required for liability "is even more difficult to circumscribe than the assistance in subparagraph (c)").
42. See supra notes 13-15 and related text.
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IV. THE MENTAL REQUIREMENT
FOR GROUP COMPLICITY
It is doubtful that any reasonably coherent interpretation of Article
25(3)(d) is possible, perhaps because the overall structure of Article 25 was
incompletely theorized by its drafters and was the product of negotiated
compromises and drafting by committee. To take just the most obvious
structural problem, Article 25(3)(d) on group complicity includes complex standards of knowledge or purpose for group complicity, allowing
for liability for contributions that are intentional and are made with
knowledge of the group's criminality. But no standards are offered for the
standard complicity categories of aiding and abetting in Article 25 (3)(b).
The problem is not simply that different standards are offered in subsection (b). That might be confusing enough-the asymmetry would require a doctrinal reason-but the problem is that the complicity of
subsection (b) articulates no standards at all. One is presumably left to
guess that the standards of Article 2 5 (3 )(d) on group complicity do not
apply to subsection (b)-i.e., that the silence is indicative of something.
But the problem is that in their absence there is no clear direction on
which standards to apply-they might be narrower than 25(3)(d) or they
might be far wider.
Further complicating matters is the explicit reference in Article 25 (3)(d)
that the contributions must be intentional. This can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. If we interpret it narrowly, it only means that the bare
action performed by the complicitous defendant was the product of an intentional decision, i.e., not an accident (as in strict liability). The problem
with this interpretation is that Article 30 of the Rome Statute says that the
default mental element for the Statute is intent and knowledge, "unless
otherwise provided." Article 30 therefore establishes a clear directive: the
other articles need only express a mental element when they want to depart from the default rule.4 3 Why then does Article 2 5(3 )(d) include a
mental element-"intentional"-that is within the default rule? Article
25 (3)(d) should only offer a mental element if it seeks to depart from the
default rule. Normally, one might say that, looking at the four corners of

43. Indeed, Article 30 specifically defines intent, in cases of conduct, as "that person
means to engage in the conduct."
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Article 25, the fact that subsection (d) includes an express mental element
would seem to suggest that that mental element does not apply to the rest
of Article 25. But if we take that presumption and run with it, we run
smack into the prohibition of the Article 3o default rule that tells us to assume a requirement of intent and knowledge. Article 25(3)(d) and Article
30 pull us in opposite directions.
If, on the other hand, we interpret broadly Article 25( 3)(d)'s requirement that the contribution be "intentional," we run into a problem again.
The broad reading suggests that "intentional" refers to the nature of the
contribution, i.e., the defendant intends to help the principals, as opposed
to a situation where the defendant performs an action that he should reasonably foresee might advance the cause of the principals (even though he
does not intend it to do so).44 However, this reading again runs into the
Article 3o default rule, which defines intent in cases of consequences to
mean that the person "means to cause that consequence or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events." Once again, the mental element requirement of Article 25(3)(d) would appear to provide for a mental element that is already within the statutory default rule, thus rendering
its explicit inclusion utterly mysterious.
There are still other mysteries to Article 25(3)(d) that are fully internal
and do not relate to its inscrutable relationship to the other provisions of
the Rome Statute. Consider, for example, that subsection (i) allows liability if the contribution is made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or purpose of the group, while subsection (ii) allows liability if the
accomplice has knowledge of the group's intention to commit their crime.
The first subsection is utterly redundant because there can never be a situation where an individual wants to further the criminal activity of the
group but lacks knowledge of that activity.45 Having the desire to further
the criminal activity presupposes, logically, knowledge of that criminal activity. Consequently, there can be no cases where a prosecution rests solely
on subsection (i). It is utterly unnecessary given the inclusion of the far
broader provision on knowledge in subsection (ii).

44. This standard for aiding and abetting is sufficient to establish liability for complicity in some jurisdictions.
45. See Ambos, supra note 9, at 14.
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V. CONCLUSION
The development of the international jurisprudence of group complicity
in the last fifteen years has combined great and historic advances with unfortunate missteps; with each advancement we have also witnessed retrogradation. Given that Article 25 is so rife with internal tension, the only
sensible solution is for the Assembly of State Parties to recraft Article
25(3)(d)-drafting from scratch rather than drafting by committee-and
simply state which doctrine of complicity they are codifying. I have argued
elsewhere that if the Assembly of State Parties were to explicitly codify
JCE or a similar conspiracy doctrine into the Rome Statute, they should
incorporate separate categories for co-perpetrating a JCE and aiding and
abetting a JCE, thus establishing a hierarchy of relative culpability among
participants in a joint criminal endeavor." They should also explicitly exclude vicarious liability for acts that fall outside the scope of the criminal
plan. But even if the Assembly rejects these specific proposals, almost anything would be more coherent than the current Article 2 5 ( 3 )(d). If the
Assembly of State Parties were to renegotiate a new Article 2 5 bis, many of
these dilemmas might be addressed. Concerns about the crime of aggression will no doubt be higher on the diplomatic agenda, but correctly recrafting the modes of liability is more urgent, since by virtue of their
location in the General Part they implicate potentially every prosecution
before this permanent court on whose shoulders we have placed the entire
weight of our noblest ambitions.

46. See Jens David Ohlin, Commentary on Prosecutor v. Stakik [The Co-Perpetrator
Model of Joint Criminal Enterprise], 14 Annotated Leading Cases of International
Criminal Tribunals 739 (2oo8).

